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This article compares how eliminating the U.S. cotton subsidy program and the 
Chinese cotton tariff-rate quota (TRQ) would affect the world cotton market. 
The results show China’s TRQ has a greater negative impact on the world 
cotton market than do U.S. subsidies. Compared to a base-level estimate, the 
elimination of China’s TRQ increases the world cotton price and increases the 
quantity of world cotton traded, whereas the elimination of U.S. cotton 
subsidies increases the cotton price (but less than under TRQ elimination) and 
decreases the world cotton trade. The combined effect of eliminating both 
programs is also shown. 
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We recall the long-term objective referred to in the Agreement to establish 
a fair and market-oriented trading system through a programme of 
fundamental reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific 
commitments on support and protection in order to correct and prevent 
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. We reconfirm our 
commitment to this programme. Building on the work carried out to date 
and without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, we commit 
ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial 
improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, 
all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support. 
Ministerial Declaration, The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference,  
Doha, Qatar, 2001 
 
Introduction 
s part of the Agreement on Agriculture referenced in the quote above, member 
nations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) during the Uruguay Round 
agreed to establish a more open, market-oriented agricultural trading system. The 
three main areas of concern, or “pillars” on which the free trade agenda is built, are 
(1) improving market access by reducing tariff rates and eliminating non-tariff 
barriers, (2) ending the subsidization of exports and improving export competition, 
and (3) reducing most internal governmental support given to producers. The goal of 
fair competition free from trade-distorting policies requires that progress be made in 
each area. As the WTO General Council has affirmed, “[T]he reforms in all three 
pillars form an interconnected whole and must be approached in a balanced and 
equitable manner”.  
Recently, two of these pillars have become the focus of a challenge to U.S. 
commodity programs by the nation of Brazil. The basic argument of the Brazilian case 
is that the domestic farm and trade policies of the United States depress world market 
prices. The contention is that such policies allow the United States to subsidize cotton 
exports, either explicitly or implicitly through production subsidies, and “dump” them 
on world markets (Beghin and Fabiosa, 2002). In 2004, the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body found against the United States in support of Brazil’s position. In a ruling that 
has been upheld on appeal, U.S. cotton price–related programs (marketing loans, 
counter-cyclical payments, market loss assistance, step 2 payments) were found to 
have caused serious harm to Brazil’s cotton producers during the period 1999–2002. 
The U.S. cotton subsidy issue has been investigated and debated since it was first 
contested by Brazil in 2002. Many researchers (ICAC, 2002; Sumner, 2003; Goreux, 
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2004; Pan et al., 2004a; Poonyth et al., 2004) have concluded that the U.S. cotton 
program depresses the world cotton price, but they differ significantly in their 
assessments of the magnitude of the effects. Meanwhile, in a study that compares the 
effects of subsidy policies and border protection, Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2003) 
find that “… tariffs matter significantly more than subsidy policies – tariff reductions 
generate welfare gains that are substantially greater than reductions in support 
policies” (p. 1). It seems that a discussion of trade-distorting policies will be 
incomplete without a consideration of all three mechanisms by which the WTO has 
agreed such distortions may arise.  
Many of the nations involved in the world cotton market offer subsidies to their 
producers or place tariffs on imports. The expected effect of removing all trade-
distorting policies in all nations would be to increase the world price for cotton and 
the quantity traded (Baffes, 2004). However, the United States has been singled out by 
the WTO due to its level of income support for its producers and its dominant position 
in the world cotton export market. Conversely, given that world cotton imports are 
dominated by a single nation with a substantial import tariff, it seems relevant to 
assess how market access restrictions by the world’s leading cotton importer affect the 
world cotton market as well. Might it be that Chinese tariff barriers have a significant 
impact on the world cotton trade, perhaps even more so than U.S. domestic policy? 
The United States is the largest cotton exporter, accounting for 40 percent of the 
total trade, and China is the largest cotton importer, with 25 percent of total imports. 
Both countries support their domestic cotton producers, but via different policy 
instruments. The United States employs a domestic price support program while 
China relies on a two-tier tariff structure for cotton imports, popularly known as a 
tariff-rate quota (TRQ).
1 TRQs have been discussed for products such as sugar 
(Skully, 2001; Petrolia and Kennedy, 2002; Vander, Beghin, and Mitchell, 2003), 
apples (Sreedharn et al., 2003), dairy (Balagtas, Rickard, and Sumner, 2002; Langley 
et al., 2003), and wheat (Koo, 2000), but very few studies focus on the Chinese cotton 
TRQ system. Although there is a broader body of literature on how China’s WTO 
accession would affect the world cotton market (Wang, 1997; Fang and Babcock, 
2003), a study has not been done on how TRQ elimination would affect the world 
cotton market. This may be due to the fact that only a few countries, such as China, 
have import TRQs (FAO, 2002). 
The purpose of this article is to compare how the trade-distorting mechanisms of 
U.S. domestic support and Chinese market access restrictions affect the world cotton 
market. The objective of this article is to investigate the effects of these two policies 
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Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  254 
•  the elimination of all U.S. cotton programs such as direct payments and 
counter-cyclical payments, marketing loans, and step 2 payments; 
•  the elimination of the Chinese cotton TRQ system;  
•  the elimination of both the U.S. cotton programs and China’s TRQ for 
cotton. 
The results obtained under these discontinuation scenarios are compared to a 
baseline projection that includes current U.S. farm programs and Chinese imports 
given its present WTO commitments.  
Effects of Price Subsidies and a TRQ 
ollowing standard texts of international trade, table 1 summarizes the effects of 
domestic subsidy and TRQ (see the technical annex: Economic Analyses) on 
domestic and world prices, the quantities supplied and demanded in both importing 
and exporting countries, and trade. The price subsidy increases the domestic price in 
the exporting country with the subsidy and lowers the effective price in importing 
markets and the rest of the world. The TRQ causes a price rise in the domestic 
importing nation and a lower price for exporters and the world market. Quantity 
traded increases with a price subsidy and decreases with a TRQ. 
 
Table 1 Estimated directional effects of a domestic subsidy by an exporting 
country and a TRQ by an importing country on prices and trade 
 
  Subsidy TRQ 
PDX (policy price effect in exporting country)  ↑  
PDM (policy price effect in importing country)    ↑ 
XS (quantity supplied in exporting country)  ↑  ↓ 
XD (quantity demanded in exporting country)  ↓  ↑ 
MS (quantity supplied in importing country)  ↓  ↑ 
MD (quantity demanded in importing country)  ↑  ↓ 
ES (excess quantity supplied to world market)  ↑ - 
ED (excess quantity demanded in world market)  -  ↓ 
QT (world quantity traded)  ↑  ↓ 
PW (world price)  ↓  ↓ 
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From this discussion it is possible to develop hypotheses in regard to the world 
market for cotton and the domestic policies of the two largest trading entities and their 
respective market-restricting policies: 
Hypothesis 1: the elimination of U.S. subsidies for cotton will raise the 
world cotton price, decrease U.S. cotton exports, decrease China’s imports 
of U.S. cotton, and decrease the quantity of world cotton traded. 
Hypothesis 2: the elimination of China’s TRQ will increase the world 
cotton price, increase U.S. cotton exports, increase China’s imports of 
cotton, and increase the quantity of world cotton traded. 
Hypothesis 3: the elimination of both U.S. subsidies for cotton and China’s 
TRQ will raise the world cotton price. 
Whether the simultaneous discontinuation of both policies will increase or decrease 
the quantity of trade (QT) is not determined by the conceptual model since the 
directional arrows show contrary indications.  
The discussion to this point has hypothesized the expected direction of changes 
relevant to the international trade of cotton. Critical to this analysis is a quantification 
of these effects. The magnitudes of these changes may be determined by the various 
supply and demand elasticities in these markets. Moreover, the effects of policy 
schemes such as TRQs and subsidy programs are dependent on the baseline level of 
price expectation and the quantity of world trade. If market prices are anticipated to be 
higher than the loan rate, there is no effect from the subsidy programs. The same holds 
for China’s TRQ. The effects disappear if China imports less cotton than their quota. 
In order to ascertain the effects of each policy alone as well as their combined 
impacts, a model is constructed that estimates cotton demand and a baseline provided 
from which projections of the magnitude of each policy might be estimated (see the 
technical annex: Basic Model Structure).  
Simulation Results 
he baseline simulation was conducted with a set of assumptions about the general 
economy, agricultural policies, and technology changes in net exporting and net 
importing countries for the period 2004/05–2008/09. The baseline projections assume 
the continuation of current agricultural policies for the five years under analysis. 
Alternative scenarios were run on the basis of eliminating U.S. cotton subsidy 
programs (scenario 1), eliminating China’s cotton TRQ (scenario 2), and eliminating 
both Chinese TRQs and U.S. cotton subsidy programs (scenario 3). The results of the 
three scenarios compared to the baseline are summarized in tables 2 through 5. Table 
2 displays the effects on the cotton A-index, the U.S. cotton farm price, the Chinese 
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domestic cotton price, and the U.S. polyester price. Table 3 summarizes the effects on 
world cotton trade, production, consumption (mill use), and ending stocks. Tables 4 
and 5 provide the effects on major cotton importing and exporting countries and 
regions respectively.  
The International Cotton Market under the Base 
In the base scenario, the cotton A-index is expected to increase by about 1.25 cents per 
pound per year over the projected time frame. World cotton production is expected to 
decrease by 12 percent in 2005/06 from historic highs in 2004/05 and is expected to 
begin annual increases thereafter. Cotton consumption (mill use) is expected to 
increase by about 6 percent between 2004/05 and 2008/09. As a result, world cotton 
traded is projected to increase by around 1.6 million bales in the time period. 
Scenario 1: Elimination of the U.S. Cotton Subsidy Program  
The effects of eliminating the U.S. cotton subsidy in this scenario are roughly 
equivalent to the findings of an earlier study (Pan et al. 2004). The world cotton price 
is estimated to increase by 2.39 percent in 2005/06 due to a 4.51 percent reduction in 
exports from the United States. The fall in U.S. exports reflects the net change in U.S. 
production, consumption, and inventories. Producers outside the U.S. respond to these 
higher prices by expanding their cotton production. Brazil is the biggest beneficiary 
from the elimination of U.S. cotton programs, with exports increasing by around 2 
percent, followed by Australia (+0.78 percent). Western Africa and Uzbekistan also 
have gains in exports, but of less than 1 percent.  
By the end of the analysis period, world cotton price changes relative to the 
baseline are down considerably from the second-year highs. Adjustments by 
competitors who boost production take away most of the price increase. For example, 
the increase in the A-index price is 0.48 percent in 2008/09 as compared to 2.39 
percent in 2005/06 (table 2). In 2005/2006, the world cotton trade declines by 
approximately 250 thousand bales (-0.76 percent) from the baseline level. However, 
the trade effects lessen by the end of the projection period, when the decline in trade is 
about 0.5 percent.  
Scenario 2: Elimination of China’s TRQ 
The liberalization of China’s cotton market via the elimination of the TRQ system is 
projected to increase the world cotton price by 5.17 percent in the first year and by 
1.92 percent at the end of the scenario period compared to the baseline. The Chinese 
cotton market price is expected to decrease by 4.48 percent in 2004/05 and 1.68 
percent in 2008/09, while the U.S. farm price is expected to increase by 2.87 percent 
in 2004/05 and 1.27 percent in 2008/09.   Pan, Welch, Mohanty, Fadiga and Ethridge 
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World cotton production is expected to increase initially by 0.20 percent and 
average a 0.18 percent increase over the entire scenario. World cotton mill use is 
expected to increase in the first four years with a small decrease after that. This is 
mainly due to the textile adjustment from China and the rest of the world. The world 
trade of cotton increases by around 1.70 percent with the elimination of the TRQ. As 
for specific countries, China is expected to increase cotton imports by 8 percent, Japan 
is expected to decrease imports by about 3 percent, Pakistan and Taiwan are expected 
to decrease imports by between 1 and 2 percent, and India, South Korea, Mexico, and 
the European Union by less than 1 percent. Cotton exports from Australia and Brazil 
are expected to increase by about 2 percent and 3 percent, respectively, while exports 
from Uzbekistan, Western Africa, and the United States are expected to increase by 
less than 1 percent. 
Scenario 3: Elimination of Both the Chinese TRQ and the 
U.S. Subsidy Programs 
If both China and the United States liberalize their cotton trades, the world cotton 
price is expected to increase by 5.72 percent in 2004/05 and 2.30 percent in 2008/09. 
The increased price is mainly due to an overall decrease in cotton exports from the 
United States (-1.99 percent) and an increase in Chinese imports of about 8 percent, 
resulting in decreased production and increased consumption in the world market. The 
U.S. farm price under this scenario is expected to increase by 8.64 percent in 2005/06 
compared with the base scenario, a much larger increase than expected under either 
scenario 1 or scenario 2.  
Interestingly, the effects on world cotton production and cotton consumption are 
relatively small. World cotton production is expected to decrease by an average of 
0.07 percent over the time frame and mill use is predicted to decline by 0.12 percent 
over the same time horizon. However, the world trade of cotton increases by more 
than 1 percent as a net effect of removing both China’s TRQ and U.S. subsidy 
programs. This is mainly due to the decrease in U.S. exports and the increase in 
Chinese cotton imports.  
The combined effect of liberalization on the world cotton market is expected to 
decrease U.S. exports (as shown) but increase exports from other major cotton 
producing regions. Using average values, exports from Brazil would show the biggest 
increase (4.99 percent) followed by Australia (2.69 percent), Uzbekistan (1.49 
percent), and Western Africa (1.30 percent). While China is shown to significantly 
increase cotton imports, the rest of the nations in this model show decreases. These 
decreases range in magnitude from 3.74 percent in Japan to 0.59 percent in India.    Pan, Welch, Mohanty, Fadiga and Ethridge 
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Table 2  Estimated impact of eliminating U.S. cotton subsidies (scenario 1), China’s 
TRQs (scenario 2), and both (scenario 3) on fibre prices 
 
   2004/05  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  Average 
          
Cotton A-index  Base (cents/lb)  51.87  53.78  56.98  57.94  58.19  55.75 
  Scenario 1  0.18%  2.39%  1.63%  0.79%  0.48%  1.10% 
  Scenario 2  5.17%  2.73%  1.94%  1.92%  1.92%  2.74% 
  Scenario 3  5.72%  5.54%  3.24%  2.53%  2.30%  3.87% 
          
Base (cents/lb)  42.42  44.53  49.42  53.00  53.06  48.49  U.S. cotton farm 
price   Scenario 1  0.38%  6.97%  3.11%  3.03%  2.31%  3.16% 
  Scenario 2  2.87%  1.89%  1.87%  1.35%  1.27%  1.85% 
  Scenario 3  3.78%  8.64%  5.62%  4.04%  3.53%  5.12% 
          
Base (yuan/lb)  5.81  6.50  6.39  6.63  6.58  6.38  Chinese cotton 
market price   Scenario 1  0.02%  0.33%  0.10%  0.03%  0.03%  0.10% 
  Scenario 2  -4.48%  -3.12%  -2.53%  -2.14%  -1.68%  -2.79% 
  Scenario 3  -4.45%  -2.92%  -2.50%  -2.10%  -1.65%  -2.72% 
          
Base (cents/lb)  62.33  62.70  62.79  62.82  63.50  62.83  U.S. polyester 
price  Scenario 1  0.07%  1.34%  0.52%  0.17%  0.07%  0.43% 
  Scenario 2  0.05%  0.08%  0.11%  0.42%  0.20%  0.17% 
   Scenario 3  0.12%  1.42%  0.63%  0.59%  0.25%  0.60% 
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Table 3  Estimated impact of eliminating U.S. cotton subsidies (scenario 1), China’s 
TRQs (scenario 2), and both (scenario 3) on the world cotton supply and 
utilization 
 
   2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09  Average 
    –––––––––––––––––––––  Million bales  ––––––––––––––––––––– 
Trade Base  32.60  33.07  33.50 33.95  34.20  33.46 
 Scenario  1  -0.20%  -0.76%  -0.56% -0.51%  -0.44%  -0.49% 
 Scenario  2  1.93%  1.52%  1.58% 1.71%  1.75%  1.70% 
 Scenario  3  1.85%  0.89%  1.08% 1.24%  1.35%  1.28% 
              
Production Base  115.64  102.16  106.56 109.73  111.82  109.18 
 Scenario  1  -0.08%  -0.75%  -0.15% -0.17%  -0.14%  -0.26% 
 Scenario  2  0.20%  0.27%  0.16% 0.18%  0.11%  0.18% 
 Scenario  3  0.12%  -0.48%  0.02% 0.00% -0.03%  -0.07% 
           
Mill use  Base  104.43  104.94  105.75 108.23  110.61  106.79 
 Scenario  1  -0.03%  -0.40%  -0.30% -0.22%  -0.18%  -0.23% 
 Scenario  2  0.23%  0.11%  0.10% 0.05% -0.02%    0.09% 
 Scenario  3  0.18%  -0.28%  -0.17% -0.15%  -0.18%  -0.12% 
           
Base 47.12  43.74  44.28 45.55  46.77  45.49  Ending 
stock Scenario  1  -0.02%  -0.58%  -0.14% -0.09%  -0.06%  -0.18% 
 Scenario  2  -0.49%  -0.64%  -0.97% -1.42%  -1.85%  -1.07% 
   Scenario 3  -0.57%  -1.21%  -1.06% -1.41%  -1.72%  -1.19% 
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Table 4  Impact of eliminating U.S. cotton subsidies (scenario 1), China’s TRQs 
(scenario 2), and both (scenario 3) on cotton imports by major importing 
countries and regions 
 
  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  Average 
   –––––––––––––––––––––  Thousand bales  –––––––––––––––––––– 
China  Base  8822.09  9484.27  10360.13  10804.30  10877.71  10069.70 
  Scenario 1  -0.02%  -0.42%  -0.17%  -0.09%  -0.05%  -0.15% 
  Scenario 2  9.88%  8.54%  8.02%  8.08%  8.05%  8.51% 
  Scenario 3  9.86%  8.44%  7.99%  8.06%  8.04%  8.48% 
            
India  Base  650.01  605.52  766.21  886.81  931.61  768.03 
  Scenario 1  -0.01%  -0.21%  -0.26%  -0.25%  -0.25%  -0.20% 
  Scenario 2  -0.27%  -0.36%  -0.40%  -0.43%  -0.50%  -0.39% 
  Scenario 3  -0.30%  -0.60%  -0.66%  -0.67%  -0.73%  -0.59% 
            
Pakistan  Base  1000.01  1442.99  1486.91  1559.46  1595.56  1416.99 
  Scenario 1  -0.42%  -1.51%  -0.83%  -1.15%  -1.07%  -1.00% 
  Scenario 2  -0.97%  -2.40%  -2.20%  -2.03%  -1.89%  -1.90% 
  Scenario 3  -0.85%  -2.28%  -3.18%  -3.17%  -2.90%  -2.48% 
            
Japan  Base  700.00  693.79  642.30  604.35  575.90  643.27 
  Scenario 1  -0.02%  -0.50%  -0.75%  -0.99%  -1.24%  -0.70% 
  Scenario 2  -1.73%  -2.22%  -2.86%  -3.61%  -4.47%  -2.98% 
  Scenario 3  -1.82%  -2.82%  -3.67%  -4.65%  -5.75%  -3.74% 
           
Base  1275.01  1233.13  1217.21  1203.66  1175.53  1220.91  South 
Korea  Scenario 1  -0.02%  -0.41%  -0.27%  -0.19%  -0.15%  -0.21% 
  Scenario 2  -0.75%  -0.64%  -0.58%  -0.55%  -0.52%  -0.61% 
  Scenario 3  -0.81%  -1.07%  -0.83%  -0.73%  -0.66%  -0.82% 
            
Taiwan  Base  1100.01  1064.43  1032.32  1009.21  991.24  1039.64 
  Scenario 1  -0.07%  -1.57%  -0.46%  -0.18%  -0.13%  -0.48% 
  Scenario 2  -3.05%  -1.10%  -0.84%  -0.82%  -0.82%  -1.33% 
  Scenario 3  -3.28%  -2.73%  -1.12%  -0.97%  -0.91%  -1.80% 
            
Mexico  Base  1600.01  1627.09  1612.95  1575.20  1510.55  1585.16 
  Scenario 1  -0.01%  -0.30%  -0.47%  -0.48%  -0.41%  -0.33% 
  Scenario 2  -0.63%  -0.74%  -0.79%  -0.73%  -0.74%  -0.73% 
  Scenario 3  -0.67%  -1.08%  -1.28%  -1.21%  -1.13%  -1.07% 
            
Base  2888.04  2615.15  2299.21  1994.47  1701.38  2299.65  European 
Union  Scenario 1  -0.01%  -0.22%  -0.34%  -0.43%  -0.53%  -0.31% 
  Scenario 2  -0.28%  -0.45%  -0.61%  -0.81%  -1.08%  -0.65% 
   Scenario 3  -0.31%  -0.70%  -0.97%  -1.26%  -1.62%  -0.97% 
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Table 5  Impact of eliminating U.S. cotton subsidies (scenario 1), China’s TRQs 
(scenario 2), and both (scenario 3) on cotton exports by major exporting 
countries and regions 
   2004/05  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  Average 
    –––––––––––––––––––––  Thousand bales  –––––––––––––––––––– 
U.S.  Base  12700.12  12945.50  13264.36  13388.50  13694.17  13198.53 
  Scenario 1  -0.66%  -4.51%  -3.01%  -2.73%  -2.40%  -2.66% 
  Scenario 2  0.73%  0.45%  0.36%  0.40%  0.31%  0.45% 
  Scenario 3  0.19%  -3.54%  -2.40%  -2.25%  -1.95%  -1.99% 
            
Australia  Base  1700.02  2539.32  2798.95  3000.31  3108.88  2629.50 
  Scenario 1  0.10%  1.41%  0.46%  0.81%  1.12%  0.78% 
  Scenario 2  2.94%  2.52%  1.35%  1.94%  2.33%  2.22% 
  Scenario 3  3.24%  2.12%  1.76%  2.85%  3.49%  2.69% 
            
Brazil  Base  2000.02  2026.77  2673.04  2844.50  2953.66  2499.60 
  Scenario 1  0.47%  2.58%  2.58%  3.03%  2.72%  2.28% 
  Scenario 2  0.13%  3.01%  4.20%  4.60%  4.27%  3.24% 
  Scenario 3  0.15%  3.44%  6.69%  7.73%  6.94%  4.99% 
             
Uzbekistan  Base  3405.03  3317.88  3062.96  2979.62  2905.40  3134.18 
  Scenario 1  0.04%  0.89%  0.83%  0.55%  0.34%  0.53% 
  Scenario 2  1.14%  1.02%  0.96%  0.85%  0.87%  0.97% 
  Scenario 3  1.27%  1.96%  1.73%  1.33%  1.15%  1.49% 
            
Base  2925.02  2817.19  2829.58  2860.57  2905.62  2867.60  Western 
Africa  Scenario 1  0.02%  0.39%  0.44%  0.56%  0.55%  0.39% 
  Scenario 2  0.56%  0.70%  0.97%  1.08%  1.11%  0.88% 
   Scenario 3  0.61%  1.15%  1.42%  1.66%  1.64%  1.30% 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  sensitivity analysis was conducted to ascertain the limit of variation of the 
results due to changes in the elasticity estimates. Two scenarios were 
considered: first, all the estimated elasticities were halved and second, the elasticities 
were doubled. The results are reported in table 6. When elasticities are reduced by 
one-half, the average A-index price under scenario 3 increases by an average 4.57 
percent compared to initial estimates of 3.87 percent. When elasticities are doubled, 
the average A-index price increase under scenario 3 is 3.29 percent, slightly less than 
the initial estimate. 
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Table 6  Sensitivity analysis of price index for cotton 
   2004/05  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  Average 
Export elasticities reduced by 50% for U.S., Australia, Brazil, Uzbekistan, and Western Africa 
A-index  Scenario 1  0.50%  2.54%  1.81%  1.11%  1.06%  1.40% 
  Scenario 2  5.29%  3.05%  2.26%  2.15%  2.11%  2.97% 
  Scenario 3  5.79%  6.70%  3.99%  3.23%  3.13%  4.57% 
         
Export elasticities doubled for U.S., Australia, Brazil, Uzbekistan, and Western Africa 
A-index  Scenario 1  0.09%  2.04%  1.06%  0.34%  0.32%  0.77% 
  Scenario 2  5.09%  2.23%  1.68%  1.67%  1.64%  2.46% 
   Scenario 3  5.68%  4.05%  2.75%  2.01%  1.96%  3.29% 
Conclusions 
.S. cotton production has been protected by federal subsidy programs under 
farm bills, while the Chinese cotton market has been protected by TRQs under 
their WTO commitments. As a result, both the U.S. cotton farm price and the Chinese 
domestic cotton price are higher than the A-index. These policies separately and 
conjointly depress the world price for cotton. Brazil, along with other cotton exporting 
nations, has called for major reforms in the trade of cotton. In seeking support from 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, these petitioners have aimed their cases solely at 
U.S. farm policy, with the demand that the U.S. eliminate its cotton subsidies. This 
study confirms the negative impact of U.S. farm policy on the world cotton trade but 
also takes an interconnected perspective with regard to the other “pillars” of overall 
agriculture negotiations that relate to cotton. A much larger negative impact on cotton 
prices is shown to be China’s system of TRQs for cotton, which restricts market 
access.     
Under the trade liberalization scenario in which the United States eliminates its 
subsidy programs while others maintain their current policies, the maximum increase 
in the A-index is expected to be 2.39 percent, and this in the second year of the 
scenario. The overall price effect is estimated to be about +1 percent. Of the exporting 
nations included in this model, Brazil would be the greatest beneficiary of such a plan, 
with their exports increasing by 2 percent. The cotton producing nations of Western 
Africa, which also have complained of the negative impacts of U.S. farm subsidies, 
would see their levels of cotton exports increase slightly (0.39 percent). However, the 
overall annual world trade for cotton will decline by about 164,000 bales (0.49 
percent).   
Alternatively, when China eliminates TRQs and others keep their programs, the 
A-index is expected to increase by 5.17 percent in the first year and level off to an 
overall average of +2.74 percent, more than twice the benefit of eliminating U.S. farm 
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subsidies. The U.S. would see its cotton exports increase by 0.45 percent over the long 
term and Brazil would expect its exports to increase by 3.24 percent, 1 percent more 
than the effect of eliminating U.S. cotton subsidies. The nations of Africa in this 
model are predicted to increase exports by about 1 percent (0.88 percent), roughly 
twice the benefit from reform of U.S. cotton programs. Rather than decease the world 
trade of cotton, this policy change would increase the amount of cotton traded by 1.70 
percent per year over the life of the five-year model presented here.    
If both China and the United States liberalize their cotton markets, the A-index is 
expected to increase by 5.72 percent in the first year and sustain a five-year average of 
almost a 4 percent gain (3.87 percent). China is projected to increase its cotton 
imports (+8.48 percent) and the annual average of world cotton traded is projected to 
increase (+1.28 percent). The United States is likely to see a decrease in cotton exports 
(-1.99 percent) but all other exporters in this model show gains. Specifically, Brazil is 
projected to increase its cotton exports by about 5 percent and Western Africa sees a 
1.30 percent increase. 
If trade negotiations are to proceed in a “balanced and equitable manner” as called 
for by the WTO General Council, changes must be discussed with regard to each 
dimension of trade rather than with regard only to a single policy in a single nation. 
This study indicates that the removal of trade restrictions in either the U.S. or Chinese 
cotton markets would increase global net welfare. At the same time, the elimination of 
both the U.S. subsidy programs and Chinese TRQs is a desirable option for the 
world’s cotton producers. This scenario would provide radical reform in the trade of 
cotton and promote greater access to the world’s markets.   Pan, Welch, Mohanty, Fadiga and Ethridge 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
*    This research was funded by CSREES, USDA and by Cotton Inc. 
1.   The TRQ system was adopted by China after its admission into the WTO in 2001. 
Under the agreement, China agreed to raise the in-quota import levels from 
7,400,000 metric tons in 2002 to 8,900,000 metric tons in 2004 with a tariff of one 
percent. The out-of-quota tariff, which was 76 percent above 7,800,000 metric   Pan, Welch, Mohanty, Fadiga and Ethridge 
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tons in 2002, is scheduled to drop to 67 percent above 8,200,000 metric tons in 
2003, 58 percent above 8,600,000 metric tons in 2004, 49 percent above 
8,900,000 metric tons in 2005, and 40 percent above 8,900,000 metric tons in 
2006 (FAS, 2001). China has not agreed to nor is it currently obligated to reduce 
the out-of-quota tariff below 40 percent or raise the in-quota import levels for 






























The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those 
of the Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy nor the Estey 
Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade.  © The Estey Centre for Law 
and Economics in International Trade.  
 